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I. INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL AND STATE COURTS in the United States issueda number of noteworthy aviation decisions in late 2012 and
2013. This article addresses these rulings, their significance and
implications, and identifies trends to watch going forward.
The discussion portion of the article is broken into subsec-
tions covering the following topics: (1) federal preemption; (2)
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for Interna-
tional Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention); (3) the Conven-
tion for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention); (4) forum non con-
veniens; (5) Continental Connection Flight 3407 litigation; (6)
the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA); (7) the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts; (8) removal to federal court and remand
to state court; and (9) personal jurisdiction in the internet age.
No attempt has been made to examine all recent cases relating
to each topic. Rather, the authors have selected and analyzed a
mix of prominent decisions by influential appellate courts and
interesting, controversial, or non-traditional decisions by federal
and state trial courts.
Federal preemption remains an evolving, hotly contested, and
closely watched issue in aviation law. In 2012 and 2013, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, and a New York state appellate
court all rendered noteworthy preemption decisions.' The Su-
preme Court ruled in April 2014 on the appeal of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Ginsberg v. Northwest, Inc.,2 but its opinion
was limited to the issue of preemption of state law contract
claims under the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.3 There remains a split between federal circuit courts regard-
1 See generally Ginsberg v. Nw., Inc., 695 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2012), rev'd, 134 S.
Ct. 1422 (2014); Gilstrap v. United Airlines, 709 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2013); Lewis v.
Lycoming, 959 F. Supp. 2d 552 (Lewis II) (E.D. Pa. 2013); Biscone v. JetBlue
Airways Corp., 103 A.D.3d 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
2 Ginsberg, 695 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2012).
3 See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1433-34 (2014).
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ing federal preemption of products liability claims,' and a
decision in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has broken with
precedent in the influential Third Circuit holding that the Fed-
eral Aviation Act preempts state law standards of care for such
claims.5
With respect to forum non conveniens jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court refused to grant certiorari to review a decision dis-
missing the claims of foreign plaintiffs despite a showing no
adequate alternative forum existed,6 while the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania refused to dismiss the claims of foreign plaintiffs
that had an adequate alternative forum after weighing the pri-
vate and public interests at play.
Precedent regarding GARA also continues to evolve. While
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether a mainte-
nance manual is a "part" under GARA," the law regarding manu-
als under GARA remains unclear. Also, the Second Circuit has
continued a trend in narrowly construing the fraud exception to
the GARA statute of repose.'
These recent developments and others are discussed in detail
below.
II. DISCUSSION OF CASES
A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
1. Ginsberg v. Northwest, Inc.
In December 2013, the Supreme Court held oral arguments
on the appeal of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ginsberg v. North-
west, Inc. 0 Ginsberg involves an action brought by a former
member of Northwest's frequent flier program whose member-
ship was revoked." The plaintiff alleged a common law breach
4 See Thomas H. Sosnowski, Narrowing the Field: The Case Against Implied Field
Preemption of State Product Liability Law, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2286, 2313 (2013).
5 See Lewis II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
6 See Bapte v. W. Caribbean Airways, 134 S. Ct. 792, 792 (2013).
7 See Lewis v. Lycoming, 917 F. Supp. 2d 366, 377 (Lewis 1) (E.D. Pa. 2013).
8 See Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 720 F.3d 333, 341-44 (6th Cir. 2013).
9 See Ovesen v. Mitsubishi XYZ Corps., 519 F. App'x 722, 723-24 (2d Cir.
2013).
10 695 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2012). On April 2, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its
holding on the case, reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision and ruling that the
plaintiffs claim under Minnesota's implied covenant of good faith was pre-
empted. See Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1433-34 (2014).
11 See id. at 874-75.
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of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 2 The
district court held that the plaintiffs claim was preempted by
the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) ,' and granted the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ADA did not
preempt the plaintiffs common law contract claim and reversed
the district court's dismissal of the action.15 The court found
that Congress's "manifest purpose" in passing the ADA was to
improve industry efficiency and "not to immunize the airline in-
dustry from liability for common law contract claims. "16
The two key statutory provisions at issue in Ginsberg are a pre-
emption clause added to the ADA in 1978 and a savings clause
contained in the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) of 1958.17 The pre-
emption clause prohibits states from enacting or enforcing "a
law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier."" The
savings clause preserves common law and statutory remedies.' 9
In analyzing the scope of the ADA's preemption clause, the
Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 20 in which the Court held, based
upon similar facts, that the ADA preempted a consumer fraud
claim but not a breach of contract claim.2 ' Central to the Su-
preme Court's holding in Wolens was the Court's reasoning that
"a state does not 'enact or enforce any law' when it uses its con-
tract laws to enforce private agreements."22 The Supreme Court
also pointed to the "institutional limitations" of the Department
of Transportation, such as its lack of any contract dispute resolu-
12 See id. at 874.
13 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1) (2006).
14 See Ginsberg, 695 F.3d at 874.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See id. at 876.
18 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1).
19 Id. at 876. The savings clause contained in the FAA provides that "nothing in
this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies." Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. former § 1506). It has since been revised as
follows: "[a] remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided
by law." 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c).
20 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
21 Ginsberg, 695 F.3d at 877.
22 Id. at 878.
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tion regime, to demonstrate that Congress did not intend to
preempt common law contract claims.
The Ninth Circuit thereafter considered the plain language of
the ADA's savings clause and noted that the ADA's preemption
clause does not expressly preempt common law breach of con-
tract claims.2 4 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that already-extant
common law state contract doctrines, such as the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, would be consistent with the
framework created by these two clauses, provided that such rem-
edies do not significantly impact the ADA's purpose of federal
deregulation.25 The absence of pervasive regulation of common
law contract disputes relating to contracts enacted under the
ADA further suggested to the Ninth Circuit that preemptive in-
tent was lacking. 6
According to the Ninth Circuit, "[a] claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not inter-
fere with the ADA's deregulatory mandate."2 Citing Wolens, the
court rejected Northwest's contention that allowing the plain-
tiffs claim to stand would expand the contract's terms or pre-
sent a "large risk of nonuniform adjudication. "28 Moreover,
Northwest made the decision, in a deregulated economic envi-
ronment, to invest in the disputed frequent flier program, and
therefore had to adhere to its contractual obligations under the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2 9
The final section of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ginsberg
explained its disagreement with the district court's finding that
the plaintiffs claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing related to both "prices" and "services."so Rather, the
ADA's legislative history suggested to it that "Congress intended
the preemption language only to apply to state laws directly 'reg-
ulating rates, routes, or services.' "'3 ' To the Ninth Circuit, a state
law claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing had too peripheral an effect on deregulation to fall
within the ADA's preemptive scope as intended by Congress.
23 Id. at 878-79.
24 See id. at 880.
25 Id.
26 Id. (citing Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 2007)).
27 Id. at 880.
28 Id.
29 Id.
so See id. at 881.
31 Id.
2172014]
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All eyes then turned to the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit
presented a cogent argument against preemption of the plain-
tiff's implied covenant claim. But in April 2014 the justices de-
cided otherwise, unanimously holding that the claim was
preempted by the ADA because it sought to expand the contrac-
tual obligations voluntarily adopted by the parties."
Justice Alito authored the decision wherein the Court first ad-
dressed whether the ADA's preemption provision applies to
common law claims such as the implied covenant." The Court
determined that the implied covenant is a "provision [ ] having
the force and effect of law," thereby bringing it within the lan-
guage of the ADA's preemption clause.3 4
The Court next asked whether a breach of the implied cove-
nant "relates to rates, routes, or services."3 5 The Court side-
stepped the Ninth Circuit's legislative history analysis on this is-
sue, concluding that the plaintiffs claim clearly related to
"rates" and "services" because the plaintiffs reason for seeking
reinstatement into the frequent flier program was to obtain re-
duced rates and enhanced services. 6
Finally, the Court turned to the central issue presented by the
case: whether the plaintiffs "implied covenant claim [was]
based on a state-imposed obligation or simply one that the par-
ties voluntarily undertook."3 7 Under Minnesota law, which was
controlling, the implied covenant is a state-imposed obligation
because it applies to all contracts (i.e., parties cannot contract
out of the covenant) .31 Citing Wolens, the Court reasoned that
the claim was therefore preempted because it enlarged the con-
tractual obligations voluntarily adopted by the parties."
The Court was unwilling to hold that all state law claims under
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were pre-
empted regardless of the jurisdiction. Rather, a state's implied
covenant may still escape preemption under the ADA if it is not
mandatory for all contracts.40
32 Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1433-34 (2014).
3 Id. at 1429.
34 Id.
3 Id. at 1430 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Id. at 1430-31.
3 Id. at 1431.
38 Id. at 1432.
3 Id. at 1426, 1432.
40 Id. at 1432-33.
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While the Court's holding leaves the door slightly ajar for
such implied covenant claims, its practical effect may be com-
plete preemption since airlines can simply contract out of a
state's implied covenant in its frequent flier agreement. If so,
consumers without any other claims are left with little recourse
except to join a different frequent flier program.4 1 In addition,
the Department of Transportation retains the authority to pun-
ish unfair and deceptive practices in air transportation."
2. Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc.
In Gistrap v. United Air Lines, Inc.," employees of United Air
Lines either refused to provide or only grudgingly provided a
plaintiff suffering from a physical disability with a wheelchair on
multiple occasions, and once unilaterally rescheduled her flight
because she was unable to stand in line.44 The plaintiffs com-
plaint asserted a number of California state law claims, includ-
ing negligence for failing to accommodate her disability and
negligent infliction of emotional distress for treating her disre-
spectfully, as well as a discrimination claim under the Americans
with Disabilities Act." United moved to dismiss the plaintiffs
state law claims as preempted by the Air Carrier Access Act
(ACAA), and the plaintiffs Americans with Disabilities Act
claims because the airport terminal was not covered by that stat-
ute. The district court granted United's motion as to both sets
of claims.
The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, and remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings." Following the Third
Circuit's holding in Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,4 9 the
Ninth Circuit held that the state law standards of care for the
plaintiffs state law negligence claims were preempted by the
ACAA's pervasive federal standards of care for transporting dis-
abled passengers,"o but state law remedies were available for vio-
lations of those federal standards.' In contrast, the court held
41 Id. at 1433.
42 Id.
43 709 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2013).
44 Id. at 998.
4. Id.
46 Id. at 999.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1012.
49 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
5o See 14 C.F.R. § 382 (2014).
51 Giktrap, 709 F.3d at 1006-07.
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the plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
not to be preempted because of the lack of pervasive regulation
of treatment of passengers in the ACAA.12 The court left resolu-
tion of these claims to the district court on remand." In addi-
tion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, agreeing with the dis-
trict court that the statute expressly exempts airport terminals
from its application. 4
3. Lewis v. Lycoming (Lewis II)
In Lewis v. Lycoming (Lewis Il), Judge Harvey Bartle of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania broke with other Third Circuit
district courts and held that the Third Circuit's finding of fed-
eral preemption over the aviation claims in that case did not
extend to the plaintiffs' state law products liability, negligent de-
sign, and negligent manufacture claims.
The plaintiffs in Lewis II brought wrongful death claims
against the manufacturers of various components of a Schweizer
269C-1 helicopter that crashed during a training flight near
Blackpool England in September 2009, killing both a flight in-
structor and his student.57 The defendants brought a motion on
the pleadings to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims as preempted by
the Federal Aviation Act.58 The defendants, relying heavily on
Abdullah, argued that the Federal Aviation Act and the regula-
tions thereunder evidenced Congress's intent to preempt the
entire field of aviation.59
The court in Lewis II found to be dicta the Third Circuit's
expansive language in Abdullah indicating that the Federal Avia-
tion Act preempted the entire field of aviation, including all
state law standards of care."o It explained, "[t]he issue of
whether the [Federal Aviation Act] preempts state products lia-
bility law was not before the court in Abdullah. Although we care-
fully take into account the full scope of the opinion in Abdullah,
52 Id. at 1008.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1011-12.
55 957 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
56 Lewis II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 557-58.
57 Id. at 553.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 554.
60 Id. at 557-58.
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its holding applies only to 'careless or reckless operation of an
aircraft.' "61
The Lewis II court was particularly persuaded by the legislative
history of GARA6 2 and its support of a theory of limited preemp-
tion of state law products liability and tort claims.6 ' GARA
preempts any state law cause of action "for damages for death or
injury to persons ... arising out of an accident involving a gen-
eral aviation aircraft . . . against a manufacturer of the aircraft"
or a component of the aircraft brought more than 18 years after
the aircraft was first delivered or the component was first added
to the aircraft.6 ' The court considered the legislative history be-
hind this limited preemption, finding that "the Committee was
willing to take the unusual step to preempting state law in this
one extremely limited instance. . . . And in cases where the stat-
ute of repose has not expired, State law will continue to govern
fully, unfettered by Federal interference."6" The court in Lewis I
noted that the Third Circuit did not address GARA in Abdullah,
and indeed had no reason to do so because that case dealt with
negligent operation, not design, of an aircraft.6 6 The court
concluded:
It is not possible in our view to read GARA in a way consistent
with field preemption by federal law in the aircraft products lia-
bility context as espoused by the defendants. If Congress in-
tended field preemption, there would have been no reason for it
to enact a narrow express preemption provision in the nature of
a statute of repose. 7
The court also noted that its view was supported by GARA's leg-
islative history." Furthermore, the court concluded that "[s] tate
products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty claims for
aircraft design or manufacture will only help, not harm, Con-
gress in obtaining its goal of maximum [aviation] safety," partic-
ularly in a case like this one where no federal regulation
specifically addressed the design and manufacture of the fuel
servo that was alleged to be defective."
61 Id. at 558 (quoting Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 371).
62 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2006).
63 See Lewis II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
64 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note.
65 Lewis II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-325(11) (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644) (emphasis omitted).
66 See id. at 557-58.
67 Id. at 558.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 559.
2014] 221
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The Lewis II court's holding that the Third Circuit' broad
statement of preemption of all state-defective law standards of
care in Abdullah was dicta and inapplicable to products liability
or design claims was a significant break with the trend among
Third Circuit district courts. While other district courts had criti-
cized the breadth of the language in Abdullah, they had never-
theless held that products liability and negligent design claims
were preempted by the Federal Aviation Act.7 0 It remains to be
seen if the holding in Lewis II signals a shift in the approach of
courts within the Third Circuit to preemption of aviation prod-
ucts liability claims. This may largely depend on whether the
Lewis I decision is appealed and reviewed by the Third Circuit.
Whatever the result, it has the potenital to impact preemption
jurisprudence nationwide. Many federal circuit courts have fol-
lowed the Third Circuit's decision in Abdullah to find broad pre-
emption of state law aviation claims by the Federal Aviation Act,
and a change of Third Circuit law could greatly impact those
jurisdictions.
4. Biscone v. JetBlue Airways Corp.
In late December, 2012, the Second Department of the New
York Supreme Court's Appellate Division-New York's interme-
diate appellate court-issued a noteworthy preemption ruling
in Biscone v. JetBlue Airways Corp.72
The plaintiff in Biscone commenced a putative class action
seeking to recover for false imprisonment, negligence, inten-
tional infliction of emotion distress, fraud and deceit, and
breach of contract as a result of being confined with other pas-
sengers on a JetBlue aircraft on the tarmac at John F. Kennedy
Airport for 11 hours. JetBlue moved to dismiss the plaintiffs
complaint on the basis that the plaintiffs tort claims were pre-
empted by the ADA and the Federal Aviation Act.74 The trial
court granted JetBlue's motion to dismiss all but one of the
70 See Pease v. Lycoming Engines, No. 4:10-CV-00843, 2011 WL 6339833, at *11
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2011); Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 731 F. Supp. 2d
429, 438-39 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Domanski v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d
725, 729 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Duvall v. Avco Corp., No. 4:CV 05-1786, 2006 WL
1410794, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 19, 2006).
71 See, e.g., Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2001);
Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir. 2009).
72 103 A.D.3d 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
73 Id. at 160-61.
74 Id. at 61.
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plaintiffs tort claims after concluding that all other claims were
closely related to the provision of services by an airline; only the
claim for negligence causing physical injury was not dismissed.
On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the trial court's determi-
nation, maintaining that "the confinement of passengers in a
grounded aircraft for an 11-hour period against their will is not
related to the provision of services, as interpreted by the ADA's
preemption clause, since passengers do not bargain for or antic-
ipate such lengthy confinement against their will."7 6 Addition-
ally, she contended that the conduct giving rise to her tort
claims was "too attenuated" from the ADA's deregulatory man-
date to result in preemption.
In opposition, JetBlue argued that the plaintiffs claims "re-
late, at their core, to an airline's services."7 In support of its
position, JetBlue cited the Second Circuit's decision in Air
Transport Ass'n of America v. Cuomo striking down a New York
passenger bill of rights law directly concerning the provision of
services during lengthy tarmac delays.80
To understand the scope of Congress's preemptive intent
when it included the preemption clause in the ADA, the Appel-
late Division began by surveying the legislative history of the fed-
eral regulatory framework for airline transportation and
relevant case law.81 It noted that Congress amended the Federal
Aviation Act through enactment of the ADA, which was based
on the premise that "maximum reliance on competitive market
forces would best further efficiency, innovation, and low prices
as well as variety and quality of air transportation."" The court
further noted that the ADA "did not repeal or alter the saving
clause in the FAA," which has since been re-codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40120(c) and currently states that "[a] remedy under this part
is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.""
The court then discussed Supreme Court cases addressing the
ADA's preemption clause and its language "related to a price,
75 See id. at 163.
76 Id. at 165.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 520 F.3d 218, 222 (2d Cir. 2008).
80 See Biscone, 103 A.D.3d at 165.
81 See id. at 167.
82 Id. at 167 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378
(1992) (internal alterations omitted)).
83 Id.
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route, or service." 8 4 Those cases were Morales v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.,8 5 American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,86 and Rowe v. New
Hampshire Motor Transportation Ass'n." The court concluded that
the the Supreme Court had yet to "explicitly interpret[ ] the
meaning of 'service' as used in the ADA's preemption
provision. "88
The federal courts of appeals are split on the meaning of the
term.8 The Ninth and Third Circuits have read it narrowly.90 In
Charas v. Trans World Airlines, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
"service" refered to "the prices, schedules, origins and destina-
tions of the point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo,
or mail," but did not encompass "an airline's provision of in-
flight beverages, personal assistance to passengers, the handling
of luggage, and similar amenities."91 The Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits, however, agree that "service" in the airline
context "include [s] items such as ticketing, boarding proce-
dures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in
addition the transportation itself."9 2 The Fourth Circuit has held
that boarding procedures fall within the meaning of the term.95
Meanwhile, the Second Circuit held in Air Transport Ass'n of
America, Inc. v. Cuomo that the ADA preempted New York's Pas-
senger Bill of Rights as "'requiring airlines to provide food,
water, electricity, and restrooms to passengers during lengthy
ground delays relates to the service of an air carrier.'"9 4
Despite the legal patchwork regarding the meaning of "ser-
vice," the Appellate Division identified "a general understanding
that the ADA's preemption provision does not preempt all state-
law tort claims."9 5
84 See id.
85 Morales, 504 U.S. at 374.
86 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
87 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
88 Biscone, 103 A.D.3d at 170.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 170.
91 Id. (quoting 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998)).
92 Id. at 170-71 (quoting Hodges v. Delta Airlines, 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.
1995).
93 See id. at 171 (citing Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir.
1998)).
94 Id. (quoting Air Transport Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 222
(2d Cir. 2008)).
95 Id. at 172.
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Turning to the plaintiffs claims, the court applied the test
articulated by then-District Judge (now Justice) Sotomayor in
the case Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc.96 "to determine whether
a state-law claim relates to a service within the meaning of the
ADA."" The Rombom test involves three steps: (1) is the activity
giving rise to the claim an airline service? (2) does the claim
"affect[ ] the airline service directly"? and (3) is "the underlying
tortious conduct ... reasonably necessary to the provision of the
service [?]"" If the answer to any of these steps is no, then the
state law claim survives.9 9
The Appellate Division determined that all three prongs of
the Rombom test were satisfied. First, "the provision of food,
water, clean air, and toilet facilities, as well as the ability to
deplane after a prolonged period on the tarmac, all relate to
and implicate an airline service." 10 Second, the plaintiffs claims
"directly address the provision of those services.""o' And finally,
the allegedly tortious conduct "was reasonably necessary to the
provision of the service."102
Specifically addressing the factual basis of the plaintiffs false
imprisonment claim, the Appellate Division determined thatJet-
Blue's confining the plaintiff on the aircraft for an extended pe-
riod of time against her will directly affected the service of
maintaining safety by controlling passenger movement. 0 These
facts were sufficiently different to distinguish Biscone from cases
found not be preempted which concerned airlines improperly
causing passengers to be detained. 1 0 4
The Appellate Division also determined that the plaintiffs
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was pre-
empted, as the conduct forming the basis for the claim related
to JetBlue's supplying "adequate water, food, restroom facilities
and breathable air at proper temperatures," among other
things, which a majority of federal circuits had determined "ex-
pressly relate [d] to airline services.""0'
96 867 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
97 Biscone, 103 A.D.3d at 174-75.
98 Id. at 174 (quoting Rombom, 867 F. Supp. at 221-22).
99 See id.
100 Id. at 175.
101 Id.
102 Id. (quoting Rombom, 867 F. Supp. at 222) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
103 Id. at 176.
104 See id. at 175-76.
10 Id. at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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However, the Appellate Division did hold that the ADA did
not preempt the plaintiff s personal injury claims and in support
cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hodges v. Delta Airlines,0 6 a
personal injury suit in which the plaintiff was injured by a case of
rum that fell from an overhead bin. 0o
Lastly, the Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiffs
cause of action for fraud and deceit was also preempted by the
ADA. 0 8 Statements byJetBlue personnel "that the aircraft would
take off or return to the gate shortly" were "directly related to
the provision of an airline service" and could not be considered
"outrageous and beyond the scope of normal airline
operations."' 0
5. In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, New York, on
February 12, 2009
For a discussion of a noteworthy preemption decision in liti-
gation arising from the 2009 crash of Continental Connection
Flight 3407, see Section E below.
B. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
1. White v. Emirates Airlines, Inc.
In its late 2012 decision Wite v. Emirates Airlines, Inc.," 0 the
Fourth Circuit considered whether a flight crew's response to a
passenger's medical emergency constituted an "accident" under
Article 17 of the Montreal Convention (Article 17)."' The court
held that the flight crew's conduct was not unusual or unex-
pected under the circumstances and thus did not constitute an
"accident."112
The decedent passenger collapsed in the lavatory while her
flight from Dubai was on descent into Houston.1 1 3 A flight at-
tendant discovered her approximately five minutes later, and
the lead flight attendant began administering emergency aid ap-
proximately ten minutes before the plane was to land.1 14 There
was "no genuine dispute that the flight crew (1) removed [the
106 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995).
107 Biscone, 103 A.D.3d at 172-73 (discussing Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336).
108 See id.
109 Id.
110 493 F. App'x 526 (2012).
I Id. at 532.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 527.
114 Id. at 527-28.
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passenger] from the lavatory and placed her on the floor; (2)
administered oxygen through a mask; and (3) alerted the cap-
tain, who notified medical personnel at the airport.""' Other
specifics concerning the passenger's care prior to landing at
Houston were disputed.'1 6 Upon landing, EMS assumed respon-
sibility but the passenger lost consciousness shortly thereafter.117
EMS administered CPR but did not use a defibrillator."8 The
passenger died in a nearby hospital two days later, with probable
causes listed as "myocardial infarction, cardiogenic shock, meta-
bolic acidosis, and respiratory failure." 1
The plaintiffs in White filed suit pursuant to Articles 17 and 21
of the Montreal Convention. 2 0 Emirates thereafter moved for,
and the district court granted, summary judgment on the basis
that the plaintiffs failed to put forth enough evidence that dece-
dent's death was caused by an "accident" within the meaning of
the Montreal Convention to raise a genuine issue of material
fact. 121
The Montreal Convention was intended to replace the War-
saw Convention and related instruments with a single frame-
work to govern "the international air-carriage of passengers,
baggage, and cargo."12 2 The United States is a party to the Mon-
treal Convention, which governed the plaintiffs' claims.'2 3 In El
Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng,124 the Supreme Court
held that a passenger is prohibited from bringing "an action for
personal injury damages under local law when her claim does
not satisfy the conditions for liability under the [Montreal] Con-
vention."22 Article 17 subjects air carriers to liability for "acci-
dents" causing injury to passengers while they are boarding,
onboard, or disembarking an aircraft.'2 6 The English translation
of the text states: "The carrier is liable for damage sustained in
case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition







122 Id. at 529.
123 See id.
124 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
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only that the accident which caused the death or injury took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of the embarking or disembarking."127 The drafters of the
Montreal Convention envisioned that Article 17 would be "con-
strued consistently" with precedent interpreting the Warsaw
Convention and its related instruments. 1 28
The Montreal Convention does not define the term "acci-
dent" for purposes of Article 17 but the Supreme Court has of-
fered guidance in two major decisions: Air France v. Saksl29 and
Olympic Airways v. Husain.30 The Fifth Circuit in White consid-
ered both decisions as well as precedent from other circuits and
various district courts in its analysis.''
The plaintiff in Saks experienced pressure in one ear as her
flight landed and was subsequently diagnosed with permanent
hearing loss in the ear.13 2 The Supreme Court concluded that
she had not sustained an "accident" within the meaning of Arti-
cle 17 because her injury was not "caused by an unexpected or
unusual event or happening that is external to the passen-
ger."' In dicta, the Court explained that this definition re-
quires flexible application based on the facts surrounding the
injury and should be left to the trier of fact where contradictory
evidence is presented,' 3 ' and that a plaintiff-passenger need
only prove that "some link in the chain [of causation] was an
unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger." 3 5
However, where the "injury indisputably results from the passen-
ger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected
operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an accident
and Article 17 of the Montreal Convention cannot apply." 3 6
The Supreme Court revisited its Saks holding in 2004 in
Husain, where the plaintiffs decedent died from an asthma at-
127 Id. at 529 (quoting Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for In-
ternational Carriage by Air, art. 17(al), May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, U.N.T.S.
350 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]).
128 Id. (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 127, art. 17(1)).
129 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
130 540 U.S. 644 (2004).
131 See White, 493 F. App'x. at 529-32.
132 Id. at 529 (discussing Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
133 Id. (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
134 See id. at 529-30 (discussing Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
135 Id. at 530 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 406) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
136 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405-06.
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tack aboard an international flight.1 31 Prior to the flight, the
plaintiff specifically requested that her husband be seated in a
non-smoking area of the cabin as cigarette smoke aggravated his
asthma.' 8 When they were seated only three rows away from the
smoking area, the plaintiff requested that her husband be
moved farther.'s Despite there being available seats, the flight
attendant refused and said the flight was full.' 4 0 The Court held
that the flight attendant's rejection of the plaintiffs explicit re-
quest to be moved was an "unexpected or unusual" event in the
chain of causation and therefore constituted an "accident" for
purposes of Article 17.141 In the Husain decision, the Court also
clarified Saks by explaining that "it is the cause of the injury-
rather than the occurrence of the injury-that must satisfy the
definition of 'accident.' "14 2
The plaintiffs in White maintained that their case was similar
to Husain in that the flight crew's response to the medical emer-
gency was an unexpected or unusual event or happening that
was external to the passenger.' 3 In particular, the flight crew
refused the plaintiffs request for medical assistance and devi-
ated from the defendant's policies in caring for the decedent
passenger. 4 4 The defendant argued that no "accident" could
have occurred within the meaning of Article 17 unless its re-
sponse to the emergency "was so thoroughly deficient as to be
considered unexpected or unusual under the circumstances."' 4 5
The Fifth Circuit first considered the plaintiffs' argument that
the flight crew refused to use a defibrillator or administer CPR
despite the plaintiffs request that they do so.14 6 The plaintiffs
relied on the district court decision Yahya v. Yemenia-Yemen Air-
ways,'47 in which the court found that, if proved, a flight crew's
refusal to divert a flight after being informed of a passenger's
life-threatening condition and the passenger's eventual death
prior to landing was an "event" of the sort required for a finding
137White, 493 F. App'x at 530 (discussing Husain, 540 U.S. at 646-47).
isa Id.
1so Id. (discussing Husain, 540 U.S. at 647).
140 Id. (discussing Husain, 540 U.S. at 647-48).
141 Id. (quoting Husain, 540 U.S. at 657) (internal quotation marks omitted).





147 No. 08-14789, 2009 WL 3424192 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2009).
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of an "accident" under Article 17.' The plaintiffs also relied on
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Prescod v. AMR, Inc.,' 9 where the
court held that an airline's losing a passenger's medical bag, af-
ter assuring her she could keep it and then taking it from her,
constituted an "accident" when the passenger subsequently died
from not being allowed to access her medical supplies.1 50
The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded and saw Husain, Yahya,
and Prescod as distinguishable because the flight crew in White
did provide medical assistance.' 5 1 It found that the plaintiff was
not a medical professional and that "the crew's decision not to
comply with his requests was not unexpected or unusual" since
the decedent passenger was breathing when she was found in
the lavatory.' 5 2 The court noted its determination was bolstered
by the fact that EMS personnel also did not use a defibrillator
on the decedent after she was removed from the plane.15 3 How-
ever, the court's reasoning is somewhat puzzling because EMS
did administer CPR. 15 4
The court also questioned whether the plaintiff inquired
about using a defibrillator or administering CPR, or requested
that they be used.'55 Notwithstanding, there is a fair argument,
based upon the Supreme Court's dicta in Saks requiring flexible
application of the standard, that the trier of fact should have
been called upon to determine whether the flight crew's con-
duct constituted an accident on this factual record. Ultimately,
however, the Fifth Circuit seemed to believe that its determina-
tion was warranted in light of the plaintiffs status as a layman
rather than a medical professional and the flight crew's attempt
to respond to the situation.15 1
148 See White, 493 F. App'x at 531 (discussing Yahya, 2009 WL 3424192, at *6).
149 383 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2004).
150 See White, 493 F. App'x at 531 (discussing Prescod, 383 F.3d at 868-80).
151 See id. at 531.
152 Id. Plaintiff Carriker testified that he asked the crew to perform CPR or use
the defibrillator, but the lead flight attendant testified that he did not try either
because Wilson was breathing. Id.
153 See id.
154 See id. at 528.
155 Id. at 531.
156 See id. The Fifth Circuit explained that its conclusion on this issue was con-
sistent with decisions by other circuits, including Hipolito v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
15 F. App'x. 109 (4th Cir. 2001) and Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d
1515 (11th Cir. 1997). However, in Hipolito, the plaintiffs decedent received at-
tention from medical doctors on-board the flight and the Court found that a
malfunctioning oxygen bottle was not an "external, unusual event under the War-
saw Convention." Hipolito, 25 F. App'x. at 112. In Krys, the passenger was also
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The Fifth Circuit next rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the flight crew's failure to adhere to the defendant's policies in
caring for the decedent was "an unexpected or unusual
event."'5 ' The plaintiffs cited the District Court for the Southern
District of New York's decision in Fulop v. Maley Hungarian1 5 1 in
support of their position. 5 1
The court in Fulop denied the defendant airline's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs Article 17 claim and
thereby left open the possibility that an airline's failure to ad-
here to its own flight diversion policies in case of a medical
emergency may constitute an "accident" in certain instances.6 o
However, the Fifth Circuit in White found that the plaintiffs' reli-
ance on Fulop was misplaced, as it had previously declined to
follow Fulop in Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc.'6 1 The plaintiff
in Blansett suffered from deep vein thrombosis and experienced
a stroke while aboard the flight.1 2 He claimed that the airline's
failure to provide pre-flight warnings and instructions on this
risk, as other airlines did despite the absence of federal regula-
tions requiring as much, amounted to an "accident."' 3 The
Fifth Circuit found that even though Blansett addressed devia-
tion from industry standards and not an airline's own policies,
alleged in White, its reasoning in Blansett still applied.164 Accord-
ingly, the central inquiry was whether the deviation was an "un-
expected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger."115
examined by a doctor onboard and thus the flight crew's response to the situa-
tion and decision not to divert the plane was not an "accident" because they were
informed by the doctor's initial determination that the passenger was not in dan-
ger. See Krys, 119 F.3d at 1515.
157 White, 493 F. App'x. at 532-35. Carriker maintained that Emirates failed to
monitor Wilson's breathing and pulse rates consistent with airline policy, and
failed to request assistance from a medical professional on the flight. Id. at 532.
158 175 F. Supp. 2d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
159 See White, 493 F. App'x at 532-33.
160 See id. (discussing Fulop, 175 F.2d at 665). The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York stated in Fulop that "the ordinary traveler reasona-
bly would expect that . . . in handling life-threatening exigencies, airlines . . .
would be particularly scrupulous and exacting in complying with their own indus-
try norms, internal policies and procedures, and general standards of care." Id.
16, See id. at 533 (citing Blansett v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.
2004)).
162 Id. (discussing Blansett, 379 F.3d at 179).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 534.
165 See id. (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
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In White, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the magistrate judge
that the flight crew's response was not unusual or unex-
pected. 16 6 The flight crew had limited time to respond because
the flight was in its final descent and the crew was also responsi-
ble for safeguarding the other passengers.1 7 There was no need
to contact MedLink and explore diverting the flight at that time,
and thus, under the circumstances, there could be no finding of
an "accident" under Article 17.168
The Fifth Circuit's holding in White sets a high bar for plain-
tiffs to survive summary judgment on an Article 17 claim based
upon a flight crew's allegedly inadequate response to a medical
emergency.
C. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
1. Ginena v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.
In Ginena v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,16 9 the captain of a flight from
Vancouver, British Columbia to Las Vegas, Nevada diverted to
land in Reno, Nevada following reports from a distraught flight
attendant that she had "lost control of the first-class cabin" due
to the plaintiffs' disrespect, verbal abuse, and refusal to remain
in their seats. 170 The plaintiffs were removed from the aircraft in
Reno, turned over to law enforcement, and required to take a
separate flight that arrived in Las Vegas three hours later than
their original flight.1 7' After the aircraft was diverted, an Alaska
Airlines employee provided inaccurate details about the inci-
dent in an email to the U.S. Marshal's office, including overstat-
ing the number of passengers involved and mentioning the
passengers' Middle-Eastern descent.'7 2 The plaintiffs brought
suit, claiming delay under the Warsaw Convention and defama-
tion for the statements in the email to the Air Marshal.17 3 At
trial, the jury found for Alaska Airlines on both claims. 17 4
The plaintiffs moved for a new trial, arguing that the court
improperly instructed the jury by failing to focus on their re-
moval from the flight and delivery to law enforcement, and that
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 534-35.
I6 No. 2:04-CV-01304, 2013 WL 3155306 (D. Nev. June 19, 2013).
170 Id. at *1-2.
171 Id.
172 Id. at *2.




the defamation verdict was against the weight of the evidence."'
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' jury instruction argu-
ment, noting that the instructions proposed by the plaintiffs
only referenced the delay generally and did not clarify the rea-
sons for delay.1 76 Furthermore, the appeals court concluded that
the trial court's instruction was at worst harmless error because
the issue of whether delivery of the plaintiffs to law enforcement
was justified did not bear on the ultimate issue in the case."7 In
addition, the court upheld the verdict on the defamation claim
because there was no evidence that Alaska Airlines acted with
actual malice in sending the inaccurate email to the Air
Marshal.17
D. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
1. Lewis v. Lycoming (Lewis I)
The plaintiffs in Lewis v. Lycoming (Lewis 1)179 brought claims
of wrongful death, products liability, and negligent design
against manufacturers of various components of a Schweizer
269C-1 helicopter that crashed during a training flight near
Blackpool England in September, 2009, killing both a flight in-
structor and his student."o The defendants brought a joint mo-
tion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint under forum non
conveniens, arguing that England was the proper forum with
much greater connections to the crash than the United
States.'"'
To succeed on a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens,
a defendant must first show that an adequate alternative forum
exists as to all defendants.'12 Then the court must determine the
amount of deference to give the plaintiffs choice of forum, giv-
ing less deference to a plaintiff who chooses a jurisdiction other
than his home forum.'8 3 Finally, if there is an alternative forum,
the defendants must still establish that the private and public
interest factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal.'84
175 Id.
176 Id. at *5-6.
177 Id. at *6.
178 Id. at *9.
179 917 F. Supp. 2d 366 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
180 Id. at 369-70.
181 Id.
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The plaintiffs argued that England was not an adequate alter-
native forum because defendant Precision Airmotive had de-
clared bankruptcy and the plaintiffs could not bring suit against
them in England without violating the automatic stay.18 5 The
court held that since the stay remained in place against Preci-
sion it could not render a decision as to Precision, and would
instead decide the motion as to the other defendants. 6 Fur-
thermore, the court found that an adequate alternative forum
existed as to all defendants, including Precision if the bank-
ruptcy stay was lifted.18 7
The court next addressed the level of deference to apply to
the plaintiffs' choice of forum. Even though the plaintiffs were
not U.S. citizens, the assumption that their choice of forum was
not convenient was overcome by evidence put forth by the plain-
tiffs that the defendant manufacturers of the engine and air-
frame of the crashed helicopter were located in Pennsylvania.' 8"
Finally, the court addressed the private and public interest
factors. The relative ease of access to sources of proof weighed
in favor of the plaintiffs. 18 9 First, the most important evidence
related to the plaintiffs' products liability claims, the aircraft
wreckage, had been shipped to the United States, making it inef-
ficient and expensive to transport it back to England for any
subsequent suit.' The defendants argued that they would be
deprived of evidence relating to the training of the pilots and
maintenance of the aircraft located in England."' In contrast,
the plaintiffs would be deprived of more important key evidence
related to their products liability claims if the case were tried in
England because some evidence of design of the helicopter's
magnetos could only be obtained from a nonparty manufac-
turer located in the United States, and could not be obtained in
a suit in England.19 2
The availability of compulsory process to ensure attendance
of unwilling witnesses balanced equally between both parties."'
While the defendants might need to call non-party fact witnesses
185 Id. at 370.
186 Id. at 370-71.
187 Id. at 371.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 372.
o Id. at 371.
191 Id. at 372.
192 Id. at 371-72.
193 Id. at 373.
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in England, the plaintiffs would need to call witnesses from the
non-party designer of the helicopter's magneto.' The ability to
view the crash site did not weigh in favor of the defendants be-
cause it could be presented to the fact-finder through pictures
and video, and physical travel to the site would not aid the fact-
finder in determining anything about defect in the aircraft. 1 9 5
The other practical concerns that made trial easy, expedi-
tious, and inexpensive weighed in favor of the defendants.""
The defendants argued that in the United States, they would not
be able to implead other potential tortfeasors located in En-
gland beyond the court's jurisdiction, including aircraft owners
and maintainers.'97 Even though the plaintiffs argued that the
statute of limitations for such claims in England had expired,
thus providing the third parties with a defense against such
claims even if brought in English courts, the court credited the
defendant's argument that the statute of limitations had not yet
conclusively expired under English law.'
The court then turned to public interests. It rejected the argu-
ment that there would be any administrative difficulties due to
court congestion because the court planned to resolve the case
without undue delay."' The interest in resolving local contro-
versies locally weighed only slightly in favor of the defendants.200
While the United States has an interest in ensuring that domes-
tic companies manufacturing parts and products do not engage
in tortious conduct causing harm, this interest is not as strong as
England's interest in protecting its people from unsafe
products.20
194 Id. at 372-73.
195 Id. at 373.
196 Id. at 374.
197 Id. at 373.
198 Id. at 373-74. Under English law, the statute of limitations for tort claims
like the ones brought in this case expires the later of three years after "'(i) the
date of death or (ii) the date of knowledge of the deceased's personal representa-
tive."' Id. at 374 (quoting Limitation Act 1980 § 11(5)). "Knowledge" refers to
whether the "'personal representative knew or ought reasonably to have known
. . . that the injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission
which is alleged to constitute negligence, and . .. the identity of the defendant."'
Id. (quoting Limitation Act 1980 § 14). The court credited the defendants' argu-
ment that since the report of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch regarding
this accident was not published until December 2010, the statute of limitations
would not expire until December 2013. See id.
199 Lewis I, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
200 Id. at 375.
201 Id. at 374-75.
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The avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws
weighed in favor of the plaintiffs.20 2 There was a false conflict of
law because Pennsylvania's interest in deterring manufacturers
from placing defective products in the stream of commerce did
not conflict with England's interest in protecting its citizens
from unsafe products, suggesting that Pennsylvania law should
apply.203 After considering all of the factors, the court con-
cluded that the defendants "failed to meet their heavy burden to
establish that the 'balance of [the private and public interest]
factors tips decidedly in favor of trial in a foreign forum.' "204
This case appears to be a relatively unusual instance in which
foreign plaintiffs bringing claims related to a crash occurring in
a foreign jurisdiction succeeded in keeping their claims in a
U.S. court. It remains to be seen if the holding in this case will
be an isolated occurrence, or whether it suggests that foreign
plaintiffs may fare better when they have wreckage located in
the United States and multiple defendants located within the
territorial jurisdiction of the forum.
2. Galbert v. West Caribbean Airways
In Galbert v. West Caribbean Ainvays, 205 heirs to victims of a 2005
crash in Venezuela of a West Caribbean Airways flight from Pan-
ama to Martinique brought suit for wrongful death in the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida.20' The district
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on grounds of forum non
conveniens, concluding that Martinique was the proper forum
for the litigation.2 0' The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari.20 s
After the highest French Court determined that there was no
jurisdiction in Martinique under the Montreal Convention, the
plaintiffs moved to vacate the district court's prior order dis-
missing their case. 2 09 The district court denied the plaintiffs'
motion because the plaintiffs failed to make a sufficient showing
to warrant vacating its prior order under Federal Rules of Civil
202 Id. at 376.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 377 (quoting Windt v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 192
(3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)).
205 715 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013).
206 Id. at 1292.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 1292-93.
209 Id. at 1293.
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Procedure 60(b) (6),210 the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed,"
and the Supreme Court again denied certiorari without
comment.212
This case illustrates the unwillingness of courts in the United
States to open the doors of the courthouse to foreign plaintiffs
to litigate claims against foreign defendants, even when they
may not have an adequate alternative forum. This case is an in-
teresting contrast to Lewis I discussed above, where a district
court denied a forum non conveniens motion brought by U.S.
defendants, even though the plaintiffs were foreign citizens and
there was an adequate alternative forum.
E. CONTINENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT 3407 LITIGATION
2013 brought two significant rulings in litigation arising from
the February 12, 2009 crash of Continental Connection Flight
3407 near Buffalo, New York, which resulted in fifty fatalities.
The first ruling was the District Court for the Western District of
New York's November 6, 2013, decision granting in part and de-
nying in part the plaintiffs' request for discovery.1 3 The plain-
tiffs sought discovery concerning the defendant's pilot hiring,
training, selection, and supervision, and the defendant's safety
records and processes, all of which related to the plaintiffs'
claims that the defendant carelessly and recklessly put the pilot
in command of the flight due to financial pressure despite
knowing that he lacked the skill, care, caution, and judgment
required to operate the Q400 aircraft. 214 The plaintiffs argued
that the pilot had a grossly deficient piloting record with red
flags that included failing at least three flight exams and a his-
tory of serious training problems prior to and with the defen-
dant, and further argued that the pilot did not meet the
210 Id. at 1294. Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that,
"[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representa-
tive from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for .. any other reason that
justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
21, Galbert, 715 F.3d at 1295.
212 See Bapte v. W. Caribbean Airways, 134 S. Ct. 792 (2013).
213 In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, No. 09-md-2085,
2013 WL 5964480, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2013).
214 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Overrule
Defendants' Objections and Compel Them to Produce Documents in Response
to Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests at 1, 3-7, In reAir Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y.,
on Feb. 12, 2009, No. 09-md-2085 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2011).
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defendant's minimum flight hour standard to transition to the
Q400 aircraft but the defendant transitioned him anyway. 15
The discovery dispute was framed by the court's earlier pre-
emption ruling that the Federal Aviation Act "created an over-
arching general standard of care" and is "supplemented by the
numerous specific safety [federal aviation] regulations. "216 The
defendant objected to the plaintiffs' discovery demands on the
grounds that the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) contain
no standard of care with respect to those aspects of the defen-
dant's operations."
The plaintiffs' motion thus raised the issue of what standard
of care applied to the plaintiffs' negligence claims with respect
to the defendant's pilot hiring, training, selection, and supervi-
sion.21 The plaintiffs argued that a general reckless or careless
standard of care applied, whether this is based in 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.13 or common law. 1 Colgan countered that 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.13 only applies to operation of aircraft and thus the stan-
dard must come from specific federal regulations for pilot hir-
ing, training selection, and supervision.220
The court first concluded that the alleged negligent and reck-
less conduct (pilot hiring, training, selection and supervision)
directly implicated air safety and therefore, in light of the
court's prior preemption decision, were governed by a federal
standard of care and not a common law standard. 22 1 The court
next agreed with the defendant that 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 only ap-
plies to the operation of aircraft, citing in support the plain lan-
guage of the regulation, definitions contained in the Federal
Aviation Act, and two cases from other circuits.2 The court was
not persuaded by the plaintiffs' contention that such an out-
come would effectively deprive them of their state law remedies
while allowing the defendant to escape liability.223 A federal
standard of care would simply replace New York's reasonably
215 Id.
216 In re Air Crash, 2013 WL 5964480, at *2; see also In re Air Crash Near Clar-
ence Ctr., N.Y., 798 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
217 See In re Air Crash, 2013 WL 5964480, at *1-2.




222 See id. (citing Elassaad v. Indep. Air, 613 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 2010); Williams v.
U.S. Airways, Inc., No. 10-0399, 2010 WL 4720844 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2010)).
223 See In re Air Crash, 2013 WL 5964480, at *3-4.
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prudent person standard, and the defendant's conduct was still
controlled by the FARs.22 ' Although more benign-sounding, the
court's decision forecloses plaintiffs' remedies under the Fed-
eral Aviation Act's savings clause while stripping them of the
ability to hold the defendant accountable for its pilot hiring,
training, selection and supervision wherever the defendant
and/or the pilot met specific, basic standards. How such a result
comports with Congress's intent to enhance aviation safety is
unclear.
Concerning the parties' dispute about the discoverability of
certain safety-related documents, particularly the defendant's
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), internal safety incident
documents, safety meetings and audits, the court sided with the
plaintiffs. The defendant asserted that discovery into ASAP, a
voluntary safety incident reporting system, and these other areas
was impermissible based upon the "self-critical analysis" privi-
lege and/or a new common law privilege.2 2 5 The court rejected
the concept of such a new common law privilege, agreeing with
the reasoning of In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27,
2006.26 It was highly reluctant to find such a privilege absent
Congressional action to protect ASAP reports and related
records.2 2 7 Lastly, the court found that a five-year temporal limi-
tation for plaintiffs' demands (i.e., five years preceding the
crash) was reasonable.228
The second significant ruling in the Flight 3407 litigation
came from the Second Circuit, which upheld the District Court
for the Western District of New York's ruling that Erie County
could not recover its expenditures in responding to and clean-
ing up the crash from the defendant airlines. 2 29 The court
agreed with the district court that New York law generally pro-
hibits recovery for "public expenditures made in the perform-
ance of governmental functions."2 0 The county could not show
that the crash and its cleanup fell into an enumerated exception
224 See id.
225 See id. at *6.
226 See id. at *7 (expressly agreeing with In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug.
27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2008 WL 170528 (E.D. Ky. 2008) (holding that no
statutory, regulatory or common law privilege applied to ASAP reports)).
227 See id. at *7.
228 Id.
229 See generally Cnty. of Erie, N.Y. v. Colgan Air, Inc., 711 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.
2013).
230 Id. at 148 (quoting Koch v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 560
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to this general rule, and the court approved of the district
court's decision not to treat the crash or its aftermath as a public
nuisance on the basis that there was neither permanent damage
nor a continuing or recurring problem.s1
F. THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
1. Ovesen v. Mitsubishi XYZ Corporations
The Second Circuit case Ovesen v. Mitsubishi XYZ Corpora-
tions22 arose from the crash of an MU-2 aircraft that killed the
pilot, whose estate representative brought wrongful death claims
against the aircraft's manufacturers.2 88 The defendants moved
to dismiss the plaintiffs claims under GARA based upon expira-
tion of the 18-year statute of repose. 234 The plaintiff countered
that the fraud exception to GARA applied and the manufactur-
ers of the aircraft had failed to properly report information re-
garding the defect at issue from a report of the United
Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to the FAA. 3
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument, holding that the
manufacturers had no duty to report the findings of the CAA
report to the FAA under 14 C.F.R. § 21.3.236 The plaintiff
brought a motion for reconsideration, and when that was de-
nied, appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 7 The
Second Circuit issued a very brief order affirming the district
court's decision for the reasons set forth in the orders of the
lower court, effectively adopting the narrow reading of the re-
quirements of 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 in relation to the fraud exception
to GARA. 238
This case seems to follow a trend across the country to read
the fraud exception to GARA narrowly, and it reinforces the
high bar plaintiffs must meet to satisfy the fraud exception.
231 Id. at 152.
232 519 F. App'x 722 (2d Cir. 2013).





238 See id. at 724.
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2. Crouch v. Honeywell International, Inc.
Crouch v. Honeywell International, Inc.239 arose from the crash of
a Piper Lance II in Kentucky.2 4 0 The plaintiff alleged that the
crash resulted from a loss of power caused by the detachment of
the magneto from the engine due to a cracked mounting
flange. 2 4 1 The rebuilt magneto was originally installed on the
subject aircraft in 2005 during an engine overhaul in accor-
dance with the Lycoming Overhaul Manual in 2005.242 Defen-
dant AVCO brought a motion for summary judgment under
GARA, arguing that the 18-year statute of repose applied be-
cause the actions it took as manufacturer occurred 28 years
before the crash.24 s The plaintiff countered that GARA did not
apply because AVCO was sued in its capacity as publisher of the
overhaul manual, not in its capacity as manufacturer. 24 4 The
plaintiff further argued that, even if GARA did apply, revisions
to the overhaul manual constituted the addition of a new part or
component, triggering a new 18-year repose period, and that in-
complete discovery suggested that the fraud exception to GARA
applied because AVCO had misrepresented or withheld re-
quired information from the FAA regarding the defect at
* 245issue.
The district court originally found for the plaintiff on the mo-
tion, holding that the GARA statute of repose did not apply be-
cause the overhaul manual is not a "part" under GARA, and its
actions were taken as manual publisher rather than as a manu-
facturer.2 4 6 However, upon AVCO's motion for reconsideration,
the district court reversed itself, holding that the repose period
applied because AVCO was required by federal regulation to
publish the overhaul manual and was thus acting as a manufac-
turer. Since the manual was published more than 18 years
previously, the plaintiffs claims were barred by the statute of
repose.248
239 720 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2013).
240 Id. at 336.
241 Id.
242 Id.
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The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, al-
though on different grounds. The appeals court agreed that
AVCO was acting as a manufacturer in publishing the overhaul
manual because it was required by federal regulation to do so,
and this activity was covered by GARA.2 49 As the court reasoned,
"[i] f Congress did not view a manufacturer's duty to publish and
update maintenance manuals as falling within its 'capacity as
manufacturer,' then there would arguably have been no need
for Congress to include" the GARA fraud exception, dealing
with the duties of a manufacturer to continuously report failures
to the FAA.250
The court determined that most case law supported the con-
clusion that the overhaul manual was not a replacement part for
the purposes of GARA.25 1 Unlike a flight manual, a maintenance
or overhaul manual is not required by law to be on board the
aircraft and is therefore not a part, so its issuance or revision did
not reset the GARA statute of repose.5 2 Even if the overhaul
manual constituted a replacement part, the repose period
would still have run because the plaintiff could not point to a
revision that was causally related to the condition alleged to
have caused the accident.253
Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to properly
allege any facts in its complaint to support application of the
fraud exception.5 4 While the plaintiff claimed that the evidence
of fraud was newly discovered, it was clear that she had that evi-
dence prior to AVCO's first GARA motion but did not move to
amend.25 5 The evidence, if anything, showed clear communica-
tion between the FAA and AVCO concerning the type of flange
failure at issue.256
This case provides needed clarity to the law in the Sixth Cir-
cuit regarding whether failure to warn claims based on an over-
haul manual will be subject to the GARA statute of repose, an
area of law that remains unclear across many circuits. The hold-
ing suggests that plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit will be limited in
the types of claims they can bring against a manufacturer. In
249 Id. at 340-41.
250 Id. at 341.
251 See id. at 342.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 343.
254 Id. at 344.
255 Id. at 345.
256 See id. at 346-47.
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particular, claims relating to a failure to warn in an overhaul or
maintenance manual likely will not survive a GARA challenge.
G. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
1. Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp.
In Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,5 the plaintiffs decedent
was killed in the crash of a Cessna 172N.25' The plaintiff brought
wrongful death claims under theories of negligence and strict
products liability against the manufacturers of the aircraft's en-
gine and carburetor.2 5 ' The defendant manufacturer of the air-
craft's engine brought a motion for summary judgment against
all the plaintiffs claims.26 o The court dismissed some claims but
held that the plaintiff could proceed on "the negligence and
strict liability design defect [and inadequate warning] theories"
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A;211 these
claims related to an overhaul of the engine in 2004.6 The de-
fendant then brought a motion for reconsideration and a mo-
tion for certification for interlocutory appeal on the issue of
whether the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement Sec-
ond) or the Restatement (Third) of Torts (Restatement Third)
should govern the plaintiffs claims.
In the landmark 1966 decision of Webb v. Zern 2 6 4 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court adopted Section 402A of the Restate-
ment Second to govern products liability claims under
Pennsylvania law. 65 Since that time, no decision of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has directly repudiated adoption of Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Restatement Third, and the Restatement
Second remains the law as applied to products liability claims in
Pennsylvania state courts.
Despite the long history of applying the Restatement Second
in Pennsylvania state courts, in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing,
Inc.,66 the Third Circuit "predicted" that when faced with the
appropriate case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will adopt
257 No. 4:07-cv-00886, 2013 WL 2393005 (M.D. Pa. June 3, 2013).






264 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
265 Id. at 427, 854.
266 563 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement Third governing products
liability. 267 Berrier was decided during the time period between
when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court certified for appeal the
issue of whether it should apply Section 2 of the Restatement
Third or Section 402A of the Restatement Second to products
liabiltiy claims in Bugosh v. I. U. North America, Inc.,2 68 and when it
later dismissed the Bugosh appeal for being improvidently
granted.2 6 9 As a result, federal district courts in Pennsylvania in-
terpreted the Supreme Court's dismissal of the Bugosh appeal as
an affirmative declination of application of the Restatement
Third refuting the Third Circuit's prediction in Berrier and con-
tinued to apply the Restatement Second to products liability
claims in diversity cases. 7 o
Due to the divergence of district court practice and Third Cir-
cuit precedent, in Covell v. Bell Sports, Inc.,71 the Third Circuit
was again faced with the issue of whether Section 2 of the Re-
statement Third or Section 402A of the Restatement Second ap-
plies to Pennsylvania products liability claims in diversity cases,
and it affirmed the holding of Berrier because there had not
been any contrary diecison by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
definitively holding that the Restatement Third should not ap-
ply.2 72 After the Third Circuit's ruling in Covell, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Beard v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.27' noted the
confusion between federal and state courts regarding products
liability law in Pennsylvania, but declined to take the opportu-
nity to adopt the Restatement Third approach to products
liability.274
Once again, relying on the Supreme Court's inaction in Beard,
federal district courts in Pennsylvania returned to applying the
267 Id. at 57.
268 596 Pa. 265, 942 A.2d 897 (2008).
269 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 876 F. Supp. 2d 479, 489 (M.D. Pa.
2012).
270 See, e.g., Thompson v. Med-Mizer, Inc., No. 10-CV-2058, 2011 WL 1085621,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2011); Durkot v. Tesco Equip., LLC, 654 F. Supp. 2d 295,
297 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Milesco v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-1233, 2010 WL
55331, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2010).
271 651 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 2011).
272 Id. at 359.
273 615 Pa. 99, 120, 41 A.3d 823, 836 (2012).
274 Id. at 120, 836.
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Restatement Second to Pennsylvania products liability claims in
diversity cases, in accordance with Pennsylvania State law."7
However, despite the divergence between its application of
the Restatement Third and the district courts' and state courts'
application of the Restatement Second, the Third Circuit de-
clined to hear the interlocutory appeal in Sikkelee, noting in its
order of rejection that "federal courts sitting in diversity and ap-
plying Pennsylvania law to products liability cases should look to
Sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts" as it had
held in Berrier and Covell.2 7 6 Effectively, the Third Circuit was en-
dorsing the deeply flawed status quo where federal courts sitting
in diversity applied an entirely different standard to products
liability claims under Pennsylvania state law than Pennsylvania's
own state courts. More than creating federal common law, the
Third Circuit has seemingly repudiated Pennsylvania state law in
favor of a standard it finds more fitting in what seems to be a
clear violation of tenets of federalism and the requirements of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins."' Unfortunately, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has not acted to make the definitive statement
necessary to resolve this contradiction created by the Third Cir-
cuit. This untenable situation would seem to encourage forum
shopping to seek the most favorable substantive law by plaintiffs,
in choosing whether to file in state or federal court, and by de-
fendants, in deciding whether to remove to federal court.
In Sikkelee, as a result of the Third Circuit's guidance that the
Restatement Third should apply, the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania permitted the parties to file new briefings on the mo-
tion for reconsideration with the understanding that the
Restatement Third applied.27 8
The defendant argued that the application of the Restate-
ment Third, rather than the Restatement Second, constituted
an intervening change of law. 7 Since it was not the actual man-
ufacturer of the allegedly defective carburetor, the defendant
275 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Shu-Bee's, Inc., No. 10-0734, 2012 WL 2740896, at
*2-3 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2012); Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 876 F. Supp.
2d 479, 490 (M.D. Pa. 2012).; Konold v. Superior Int'l Indus. Inc., 911 F. Supp.
2d 303, 312 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
276 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., No. 4:07-cv-00886, 2013 WL 2393005,
at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 3, 2013) (quoting Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., No.
12-8081, 2012 WL 5077571, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 17, 2012)).
277 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal courts sitting in diversity to apply
state law and not create any federal common law).
278 Sikkelee, 2013 WL 2393005, at *2.
279 Id. at *5.
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could not be liable under the Restatement Third, which only
allowed for liability of sellers or distributors of a product, as de-
fined in Section 20.280 This did not provide for liability as a de
facto manufacturer as had previously been found by the court
when it had applied the Restatement Second. 8 '
The court disagreed, holding that application of the Restate-
ment Third, as compared to the Restatement Second, did not
constitute an intervening change in applicable law.2 82 While
Pennsylvania had adopted Sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement
Third, there was no indication that Pennsylvania had adopted
the definitions in Section 20 of the Restatement Third regard-
ing who could be sued under Sections 1 and 2.28" As a result,
there was no intervening change of applicable law. 8
Since the Third Circuit denied the interlocutory appea 28 1
and the Middle District of Pennsylvania issued its subsequent de-
cision in Sikkelee," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recog-
nized the need to resovle the ongoing confusion over the
Restatement applicable to products liability under Pennsylvania
law by granting allocatur to hear arguments in Tincher v. Omega
Flex, Inc.2 11 to determine "[w]hether [it] should replace the
strict liability analysis of Section 402A of the Second Restate-
ment with the analysis of the Third Restatement." 28 8 While the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has heard argument in the Tincher
case, it has yet to render its decision, and seems in no hury to do
so, as it granted allocatur March 26, 2013, heard oral argument
in October 2013, and has still not rendered a decision.8
This case highlights how each state's piecemeal adoption of
portions of a Restatement can have an important impact upon
litigation. Moreover, it also illustrates how the differences be-
tween the Restatement Third and the Restatement Second will
often be brought into stark contrast by this piecemeal adoption
process, resulting in some growing pains as state and federal
courts each try to advance substantive products liability law in
280 Id
281 Id.
282 See id. at *6.
283 See id.
284 See id.
285 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 2012 WL 5077571, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct.
17, 2012).
286 Id.





states across the country. While it was not an issue of particular
impact in Sikkelee, the fact that, at least for now, Pennsylvania
state courts and federal courts are applying different substantive
law to identical claims is highly problematic. It seems like the
federal courts are trying to impose their own view of the proper
applicable standard in products liability cases without the sup-
port of state law as interpreted by state courts, and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has been slow to address this
contradiction let alone resolve the ongoing contradiction.
H. REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT AND REMAND TO
STATE COURT
1. Dayton v. Alaska
The plaintiff in Dayton v. Alaska2 0 sued the State of Alaska for
the wrongful death of her decedent in the crash of an Air Force
C-17 during an Alaska Air National Guard practice flight.2 9 1 The
plaintiff brought suit in state court pursuant to Alaska Statute§ 26.05.145, which provides a member of the military with a
cause of action against the state for damages resulting from "in-
tentional misconduct within the course and scope of employ-
ment or agency and with complete disregard for the safety and
property of others."29 2 The plaintiff then brought a third party
complaint against the United States and the estates of the
downed aircraft's flight crew under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).29 The United States removed the case to the Federal
District Court for the District of Alaska, and promptly filed an
unopposed motion to dismiss pursuant to Feres v. United States,294
arguing that "the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for
allegedly tortious conduct that is incident to military service."2 9 5
Alaska then filed a cross-motion to dismiss, arguing that because
the Alaskan Air National Guard (AANG) flight crew were em-
ployees of the United States, the Feres doctrine also barred the
plaintiffs claims against it.29 6 The plaintiff filed a motion to re-
mand, arguing that, since the United States was no longer a
290 No. 3:12-cv-00245, 2013 WL 3712408 (D. Alaska July 12, 2013).
291 Id. at *1.
292 Id. at *1 (quoting ALAsKA STAT. § 26.05.145 (2008)).
293 Id.
294 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
295 Dayton, 2013 WL 3712408, at *1.
296 Id. at *2.
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party, there was no federal jurisdiction over its state law
claims.297
The court held that the Feres doctrine did not apply to the
plaintiffs claims against Alaska, and that the case must be re-
manded to state court because it had no jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs original claim against the State.29 8 The complaint
named the State, not the AANG, as the defendant, so the fact
that AANG was a hybrid state and federal entity did not mat-
ter.299 The Alaska Supreme Court had previously determined in
Himsel v. Statesoo that "the State may be held vicariously liable
under state law for the actions of a pilot if that pilot could be
considered a 'borrowed employee' of the State for the purposes
of the flight[.]"so' As a result, the district court determined that
the fact that the pilot was a federal employee did not conclu-
sively prevent the plaintiffs suit under the Feres doctrine.3 0 2
While the State argued that the potential application of the Feres
doctrine justified federal jurisdiction, it is well established that
anticipated defenses do not enlarge the district court's federal
question jurisdiction when the plaintiff has only brought state
law claims.sos
Alaska also argued that the plaintiffs reliance on federal regu-
lations in its complaint justified federal question jurisdiction.0 4
The court rejected this argument as well, holding that the plain-
tiff only referenced federal regulations as evidence of the State's
negligence, and mere reference to federal regulations does not
create federal question jurisdiction.0 5
Finally, the district court refused to exercise supplemental ju-
risdiction over the plaintiffs claims because there was no activity
on the merits of the case in federal court and there would be no
time or resources saved by the case remaining in federal
court.soe
297 Id. at *1.
298 Id. at *3, *5.
299 Id. at *2.
3o0 Himsel v. State, 36 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2001).
301 Dayton, 2013 WL 3712408, at *2 (citing Himsel, 36 P.3d at 36).
302 Id. at *2-3.
303 Id. at *3.
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2. Marshall v. Boeing Co.
Marshall v. Boeing Co.so7 addressed the question whether plain-
tiffs' state law claims were severable from a third-party action
filed by defendant Boeing against Lot Polish Airlines (LOT), a
foreign sovereign, and could therefore be remanded to state
court."os The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to sever
and remand, finding that it had original jurisdiction over the
third-party action and supplemental jurisdiction over the plain-
tiffs' original claims against Boeing under 28 U.S.C.§ 1367(a).so9
The case arose out of the emergency wheels-up landing in
Warsaw, Poland, of LOT Flight 016 out of Newark, New
Jersey.310 The plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook
County for personal injuries against the aircraft's manufacturer
(Boeing) and Mach II Maintenance Corp. (Mach II). 311 Boeing
filed a third-party complaint against LOT, the operator, and
LOT thereafter removed the entire action to federal court.31 2
The plaintiffs then brought a motion to sever their original state
law claims from the third-party action and remand those claims
to state court, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) allowed for re-
mand of their state law claims because they were not within the
original or supplemental jurisdiction of the court. 13
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and refused to
sever or remand the case.314 The court first noted that § 1441(c)
did not apply because federal jurisdiction is not based on fed-
eral question, but based on the identity of the parties in accor-
dance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)."'1
Boeing's claim against LOT was a state law claim but the court
had jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA because LOT was a for-
eign sovereign or sovereign instrumentality.3 1 6 In addition, the
court found that § 1441(c) did not apply because the district
court had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims, as
they arose from the same case and controversy as Boeing's third-
307 640 F. Supp. 2d 819 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
308 See id.
309 Id. at 822-24.
310 Id. at 820.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 821.
314 Id. at 824.
315 Id. at 822.
316 Id.
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party contribution claim against LOT."' The plaintiffs' claims
"derive [d] from a common nucleus of operative facts" because
both sets of claims related to the cause of the emergency land-
ing at Warsaw's Chopin Airport.""
The plaintiffs maintained that it made no sense to read 28
U.S.C. § 1441 as requiring severance and remand of all state law
claims in cases involving federal questions but not in claims re-
moved under section (d) of that statute (i.e., actions against for-
eign states)."1 The district court disagreed, reiterating that
jurisdiction was conferred under the FSIA and, given the factual
connection between the claims, "there can be no compelling ar-
gument that Congress intended those claims to be re-
manded."3 2 0 The court also found that policy reasons warranted
treating claims removed under the FSIA differently, and that ju-
dicial economy would be best served by litigating the claims
together.sex
The Marshall case reinforces the distinction between the rare
claims that fall under § 1441(c) and the vast majority of claims
that will be subject to supplemental jurisdiction. This case seems
to suggest that federal courts will generally choose the efficiency
of trying all claims arising from a single crash together. Parties
must remain mindful of the involvement of potential parties
that are instrumentalities of a foreign government in analyzing
whether a case is likely to end up in a federal forum.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNET AGE
1. Murphy v. Cirrus Design Corp.
In Murphy v. Cirrus Design Corp., 22 the New York Supreme
Court for Erie County took a common sense approach in exer-
cising personal jurisdiction under New York law over an out-of-
state defendant based on its contacts, including an interactive
website, with the aircraft's pilot/owner and New York. 23 The
case arose from the crash of a Cirrus SR-22 aircraft near Cleve-
land, Ohio. 3 24 The estates of two decedents killed in the crash
brought negligence and breach of contract claims against the
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 823.
320 Id.
321 See id.
322 No. 2011-1824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 2013).
323 See generally id.
324 See id. at 1.
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UND Aerospace Foundation (Foundation) related to training
the Foundation provided to the decedent pilot of the aircraft,
particularly with respect to certain SR-22 systems and avionics. 2
The Foundation moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing inter alia that any allegedly
deficient training occurred in Minnesota and not New York.12 1
The court first determined that personal jurisdiction over the
Foundation could be exercised pursuant to New York's long-arm
provision."2 It found that the Foundation, through its own con-
duct with the decedent, engaged in certain activities in New
York as a prerequisite to allowing him to undergo transition
training on the SR-22 aircraft in Minnesota.12 1 Most notably, the
Foundation required that the decedent register online the
Foundation-developed training software that he received, accept
an online end-user license agreement for the software, and com-
plete training modules and quizzes using the software.3 29 The
court also found, among other contacts, that the Foundation
had indirect business contact with the decedent pilot in New
York via defendant Kaplan, who received specialized training
credentials from the Foundation and used materials developed
by the Foundation in provided training to the decedent pilot in
New York on multiple occasions. 3
The court made two other important determinations with re-
spect to its long-arm jurisdiction analysis. First, it held that de-
fendant Cirrus' New York activities-particularly the shipment
to the decedent pilot of important training materials that the
Foundation helped develop-were attributable to the Founda-
tion as such activities were contemplated by agreements be-
tween Cirrus and the Foundation and the activities benefited
the Foundation.'
Second, the court found that the Foundation's website, as it
existed from fiscal year 2005 though fiscal year 2011, was (as the
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 4. CPLR § 302(a) (1) states in part that "a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . .. who in person or through an agent . . .
transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or
services in the state." Id. at 1.
328 Id. at 2.
329 Id. The court found that Doran's acceptance of the software's End-User
License Agreement created an enforceable contract. See id. (citation omitted).
330 Id. 2-3.
331 Id. (citing Alan J. Lupton Assocs., Inc. v. Ne. Plastics, Inc., 105 A.D.2d 3, 7
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984)).
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plaintiffs put it) "'sufficiently interactive so as to consist of pur-
poseful activity in New York."3 3 2 It noted that the Foundation
directed the decedent and other New York residents to its pro-
prietary online training portal, required the decedent to register
the aforementioned training software via the internet, and the
Foundation sold merchandise and training software via its web-
site which it would ship to New York and other states."
The court also determined that personal jurisdiction could be
exercised over the Foundation pursuant to New York's general
jurisdiction provision. It was satisfied that the Foundation
knowingly and purposefully availed itself of the privilege of do-
ing business in New York by virtue of its direct contacts with the
decedent in New York and indirectly through defendants Cirrus
and Kaplan. 3
The Murphy decision, particularly the court's long-arm analy-
sis concerning the Foundation's internet contact with the plain-
tiff's decedent, offers an example of a court accounting for the
rapidly changing realities of business in the internet age while
adhering to the traditional tenets of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence.
III. CONCLUSION
Looking ahead to 2014, preemption is likely to remain in the
spotlight. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Northwest, Inc.
v. Ginsberg will be closely scrutinized. Though the Court issued a
narrow ruling, practitioners and court watchers will still be look-
ing for signals regarding federal preemption of products liability
claims. The bigger question remains if, when, and under what
circumstances the Court will tackle this issue and the diverse le-
gal patchwork created by the split among the circuit courts of
appeals. In the interim, it will be interesting to see the impact of
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's deci-
sion in Lewis II, which supports a broader trend of courts show-
ing deference to the traditional police powers of the states in
332 Id. at 4 (citing Audiovox Corp. v. S. China Enter., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-
051420JS-WDW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104656 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2012)).
333 Id.
34 Id. at 5. CPLR § 301 allows a court to exercise "such jurisdiction over per-
sons, property, or status as might be have been exercised heretofore." Id. at 1.
33 Id. at 5.
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ensuring consumer safety, and a strengthening of the presump-
tion that state standards can coexist with federal regulations.3 6
336 See Steven R. Pounian & Jared L. Watkins, Pulling Back? Courts, Preemption
and Products Liability Claims, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 20, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.
newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202582073348/Pullint-Back-Courts-Preemption-
and-Liability-Claims?slreturn=20140703235214.
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